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of the relation back rule may be based. With such a repudiation of
the relation back rule, priority, as between liens and contract liens or
any combination thereof, would simply depend on the times of the
filing of notices of lien or recording of the contract liens.
Furthermore, in Penland v. Red Hill Methodist Church,52 the
court held, in deciding a venue question, that as far as an interest in
real property is concerned there is no essential difference between a
statutory lien and a contract lien. 52 Hence, there is little reason why
the recordation of statutory liens and the recordation of contract liens
should not be given the same effect. This would make the rules easy
of application and produce uniformity in lien law generally.
WILLIAm H. BonBirr, JR.
Pleading-Unnecessary Allegations in Answer-Motion to Strike
Plaintiff instituted an action against defendant administrator to compel defendant to pay plaintiff, as sole distributee, assets of the estate of
one Arsemus Chandler. Plaintiff alleged that he was born of the marriage between Arsemus Chandler and Della Fender Hensley and is the
son and only heir of Arsemus Chandler. The defendant specifically
denied this allegation and for further answer and defense set out
matter to the effect that plaintiff was born to Della Fender more than
two years after she and Arsemus Chandler separated and that plaintiff
was not the son of Arsemus Chandler. In apt time plaintiff moved to
strike this further answer and defense. The motion was overruled. In
an opinion by Justice Winborne the North Carolina Supreme Court
reversed saying;
"The plea of denial controverts and raises an issue of fact between the
parties as to each material allegation denied, and forces the plaintiff to
prove them.. . . averments of evidence which defendant contends sustain
his denial of the controverted facts are irrelevant as pleading and have
no place in the answer .... 1
This decision seems inconsistent with an earlier case where the
allegation sought to be stricken was but an, elaboration of the denial
previously made. The trial judge refused to strike the unnecessary
allegation. The Supreme Court affirmed, saying that since under the
denial the evidence would be competent with or without the explanatory
-2226 N. C. 171, 37 S. E. 2d 177 (1946).
"'And we see no essential difference in so far as an interest in real property

is involved, in an action to foreclose a mortgage, a lien created by contract, and
in one to foreclose a specific statutory lien on real property." Penland v,
Red Hill Methodist Church, 226 N. C. 171, 173, 37 S. E. 2d 177 (1946).
' Chandler v. Mashburn, 233 N. C. 277, 63 S. E. 2d 553 (1951).
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NOTES AND COMMENTS

allegation, it was doubtful whether the ruling affected such a sub2
stantial right as to be appealable.
In the present case counsel for plaintiff urged that the matter was
irrelevant; that his client would be prejudiced3 by its retention in the
pleadings; and that therefore the case fell within the "irrelevant and
prejudicial" rule of Hinson v. Britt.4 Quaere, however, as to whether

the court considered the Hinson case controlling in this case. 5
The court's reference to the facts alleged therein as irrelevant does
not mean that they are irrelevant to the issue at hand, for the opposite
is clearly true. The allegations are irrelevant only in the sense that
they are unnecessary. Nor did the court indicate that the plaintiff
would be injured by the retention of the matter in the pleadings
(unless it be assumed that the reversal of an interlocutory ruling necessarily implies prejudice). 6
Thus it appears that for the first time the court has squarely held
that it is improper pleading to allege affirmatively matter which could
be presented in evidence under a general denial.
The rule appears to be a sound one and if followed it will force a
'Teasly v. Teasly, 205 N. C. 604, 172 S. E. 197 (1937). See also, Virginia
Trust Company v. Dunlop, 214 N. C. 196, 198 S. E. 645 (1938).
'The possibility of prejudice cannot successfully be advanced as a ground
for the motion to strike. Parker v. Duke University, 230 N. C. 656, 657, 55 S. E.
2d 189, 190 (1949). Tar Heel Hosiery Mill v. Durham Hosiery Mills, 189 N. C.
596, 152 S. E. 794 (1930). See Brandis and Bumgarner, The Motion to Strike
Pleadings in North Carolha, 29 N. C. L. Rv. 3 (1950). After the motion has
been denied on some proper ground, the trial court will be reversed only on a
showing of prejudice. Hinson v. Britt, 232 N. C. 379, 61 S. E. 2d 185 (1950).
In passing it is interesting to note that most of the few cases where the trial
judge has been reversed for failure to strike involved allegations of matter that
clearly would have been incompetent as evidence. Parlier v. Drum 231 N. C.
155, 56 S. E. 2d 383 (1949) ; Parish v. Atlantic Coast Line I. R. 221 N. C. 292,
20 S. E. 2d 299 (1942) ; Sayles v. Loftis, 217 N. C. 674, 9 S. E. 2d 393 (1940);
Duke v. Crippled Children's Commission, 214 N. C. 570, 199 S. E. 918 (1938).
' 232 N. C. 379, 61 S. E. 2d 185 (1950). "The court does not correct errors
of the Superior Court unless such errors prejudicially affect the substantial rights
of the party appealing. Hence the denying or overruling of a motion to strike
matter from a pleading under the provisions of G. S. 1-153 is not ground for
reversal unless the record affirmatively reveals these two things: (1) That the
matter is irrelevant or redundant; and (2) that its retention in the pleading will
cause harm or injustice to the moving party." Followed in Buchanan v. Dickerson, Inc., 232 N. C. 421, 61 S. E. 2d 187 (1950).
'The court makes no reference to the Hinson case or to the earlier cases
where it has attempted to resolve what matter is irrelevant as pleading and when
it will be stricken. For an exhaustive discussion of these cases see, Brandis and
Bumgarner, The Motion to Strike Pleadingsin North Carolina,29 N. C. L. RPFv.
3 (1950).
"In an appeal from an interlocutory order which does not destroy, impair,
or seriously imperil some substantial right of appellant, unless corrected before
the trial, this court, ordinarily, will not interfere with the order entered."
Light Co. v. Bowman, 231 N. C. 332, 56 S. E. 2d 602 (1949).

490

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.29

decided change in the widely prevalent practice among attorneys of
denying an allegation and then setting out at great length a differing
version of the facts. As a practical matter, it is unlikely that many
attorneys will bother to object to this type of pleading so long as the
matter contained in the allegation is not really harmful to their clients.
The old forms will probably continue to be used and tolerated to a great
extent.
EARL W. VAUGHN.

